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Neurophenomenology
               http://constructivist.info/11/2/407.solomonova
present” (Pacherie 1999). This characteristic 
of perception sets the standard for what we 
consider “real” in the most basic sense and, 
by the same token, allows us phenomeno-
logically and cognitively to distinguish an 
act of perception from an act of dreaming 
or imagining. as for imagination, it also 
inherits from perception many of its traits, 
and therefore should also be explained in 
perceptual terms, regardless of the fact that, 
as Jean-Paul sartre (2004: 207) pointed out, 
they work intimately together. In summary, 
(visual) perception, imagination, dreaming 
and hallucinations share a phenomenal na-
ture, but there are also important differences 
between them (cf. also McGinn 2004: 209).
« 11 » another bugging general issue 
concerns the rationale the authors offer to 
defend the embodied approach to the dream 
experience. It is correct to say that dreams 
pose a challenge to the (enactivist and) em-
bodied approach since an online interaction 
between the agent and its surroundings is 
required to operate and make sense of the 
world on the agent’s part. Embodiment, how-
ever, is at odds with lived experience, as the 
body during dreaming is usually inert (except 
for the inner bodily functions) and there is no 
overt behavior on the agent’s part, something 
the authors are well aware of. so, imagina-
tion is supposed to be the link that somehow 
relates embodiment with dream content and 
dream breadth (§15). But it is very hard for 
me to understand how imagination is to do 
the job, as imagination also suffers from the 
same problems as hallucinations and dreams 
regarding the lack of functional and casual 
anchoring mentioned above. One would 
suppose that memory could do the job, as it 
can somehow link content derived from on-
line interaction with the world, with content 
derived from inner activity within the body 
(brain activity, for instance), pretty much in 
the same way Hume related perception to 
ideas. But there is not a satisfying discussion 
in this respect, only a hint when speaking of 
“enactive imagination” (§17).
« 12 » Finally, I sympathize with the idea 
of considering dreams and hallucinations as 
“creative, imaginative processes” and also 
with the implicit idea that we should not sad-
dle the study of hallucinations and dreams 
with a veridical/nonveridical dichotomy at 
the outset, highlighting instead the emotion-
al component in the experiences (§17). But if 
cognition is indeed a “form of embodied ac-
tion” (§18), then it remains to be shown how 
off-line mental phenomena can be seen as 
embodied and, at the same time, recognized 
in their essential (functional and phenom-
enological) similarities and differences.
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> upshot • Solomonova and Sha draw in-
spiration from the work programme that 
sparked the enactive extension to cogni-
tive science, and propose a framework 
for dream scientists. This case study for a 
renewed cognitive science highlights key 
points that are worth developing, in light 
of current practices in neuroscience.
« 1 » Elizaveta solomonova and sha 
Xin Wei present a powerful account of the 
neurophenomenology of dreaming as a na-
scent discipline within the cognitive science 
framework extended to enaction. The disci-
pline of cognitive science, which has run out 
of steam in recent years (Miller 2003; varela, 
Thompson & Rosch 1991), needs to rein-
vent itself. taking inspiration directly from 
the work programme devised by enaction 
theorists, solomonova and sha take the bull 
by the horns and, by describing a full frame-
work for the study of dreams, also roll out a 
complete case study for a renewed cognitive 
science!
« 2 » Dreaming is probably one of the 
most difficult topics to study empirically, un-
derstandably, and it is amusing to see such a 
fruitful discussion emerging from that noto-
rious blind spot in cognitive science. In my 
opinion, the authors describe the right steps, 
in the right order, almost in an exact align-
ment with the founding fathers of enaction. 
a few points deserve to be noted, which may 
not be straightforward to all cognitive scien-
tists, and certainly not to all neuroscientists.
« 3 » First, the inseparability of imagi-
nation from perception. This is probably 
an easy(-ier?) move for “dream” scientists, 
and still a key milestone yet to reach for 
most cognitive scientists, in general, and for 
neuroscientists in particular. Both scientific 
realism and Western philosophy are so per-
vasive in every step of the scientific method 
that it has become difficult to unlearn the 
most basic assumptions we taught ourselves 
for years. For a modern, Western, not-so-
computationalist cognitive scientist who 
might be open to “a new way of thinking,” 
it is one thing to agree that perception is 
an active and engaged process, maybe even 
discarding some Cartesian concepts. It is an 
entirely different affair, however, to grasp 
the ensuing consequence: not only is the 
perception-action loop constitutive of the 
agent-world relationship, but it is also a core 
mechanism whereby the agent is to the world 
(“être au monde” à la Maurice Merleau-Pon-
ty), perpetually creating itself and creating 
the world at the same time, quite literally.
« 4 » In dream science, imagination is 
a necessary requirement, but for our young 
cognitive scientist it might still be unclear 
why this is relevant to the realm of processes 
that occur in awake time – and it is! Imagi-
nation is a self-imposed bias onto one’s per-
ception; self-imposed by an act of volition, 
or as a side effect of psycho-physiological 
dynamics. The theatrical and performa-
tive cast imbued in dreams, as emphasized 
by solomonova and sha, is also present in 
awake time, and, I posit, constitutive of ev-
ery single cognitive processes. For instance, 
in grasping (to take a striking example), the 
embodied interaction of the hand with the 
warm cup of tea is not driven by the empty 
exploration of space through limited sen-
sory input. It is driven by the imagination of 
what the evolving relationship of the hand 
with the world should be like, in light of pre-
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vious such interactions. It is the anticipation 
of sensorimotor contingencies, as the result 
of repeated training of interaction. The con-
sequence is simple, fingers do not follow a 
carefully crafted plan, they move in synergy, 
continually adjusting their being-to-the-
world to what the world feels like. Of impor-
tance, this conceptualization is not related 
to “action-oriented predictive processing” 
or derivatives (Clark 2015). unlike most 
predictive coding frameworks, enaction fo-
cuses on the interaction of both top-down 
and bottom-up processing, and does not im-
ply the creation and maintenance of a com-
plete model of the world (Roesch, Nasuto & 
Bishop 2012).
« 5 » second, a direct consequence 
of that realisation relates to the decision 
about what comes first, subjectivity in the 
lived experience or the perception-action 
loop. Emphasising the role of performative 
perception for identity and sense-making, 
solomonova and sha cast a vote in favour 
of the primacy of subjectivity. This move 
has practical consequences for the way that 
our cognitive scientist would go about em-
pirically studying the mechanisms of their 
desired object of interest. solomonova and 
sha thus formulate provisions for dream sci-
entists, in a discussion of first-, second- and 
third-person data. again, because of the na-
ture of the beast, it makes sense that a dream 
scientist would seek to emphasise the role of 
first-person data, putting all three kinds of 
data at level, more than a cognitive scientist 
working on grasping, say. as presciently de-
vised in the enaction research programme, 
focusing solely on third-person data – as 
is mostly the case in cognitive science and 
neuroscience – is a mistake. This mistake, in 
my opinion, has been responsible for driv-
ing the field to attractor points, which now 
yield distorted theoretical perspectives.
« 6 » Most of modern knowledge about 
the brain comes from third-person data, 
such as electroencephalography (EEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging 
measuring blood oxygenation level-depen-
dent responses (fMRI-BOLD). a typical 
experiment using fMRI-BOLD, to take just 
one example, yields colourful blobs typically 
opposed to other parts of the neural tissue 
in black. The analysis of this data is readily 
interpreted in terms of modules and rep-
resentations; i.e., what shows up in black 
means it is not being used, therefore it is 
not doing anything meaningful for that par-
ticular task that elicited the colourful blobs. 
taking this third-person data at face value 
for understanding the way the brain works 
is a mistake.
« 7 » I am not, of course, implying that 
the whole of the data in cognitive neurosci-
ence is wrong and should be thrown out 
with the bathwater. I do think, however, that 
its interpretation is misconstrued at times. 
The measured change of electrical and elec-
trophysiological correlates can under-rep-
resent the complexity of the biological pro-
cesses at play, and may in fact be dependent 
on the implementation of the measuring de-
vice itself and ensuing analytical practices. 
For instance, if the hemodynamic response 
function, representing the BOLD signal, is 
believed to span over 20 seconds (Logothe-
tis et al. 2001), the sampling of this signal is 
typically done every 2 to 3 seconds at best 
– that is 2000× to 3000× the time it takes for 
one neuron to propagate an action potential. 
The inability of this technique to account for 
the minute and continuous variation of the 
signal is a significant and known limitation 
of the hardware. Yet a typical statistical anal-
ysis will aggregate measures of this signal 
that tend to be time-locked, artificially seg-
regating physiological variables of interest. 
By giving such a weight to this kind of data 
when formulating theories, we have dis-
torted our interpretation by solely focusing 
on time-locked, localised, linear processes 
“activated” for a significant amount of time, 
which must therefore be exchanging infor-
mation in the form of representations.
« 8 » to conclude: of course, solomon-
ova and sha do not propose magic solutions 
to the challenges of obtaining meaningful 
third-person data. They do list a number of 
features that could be extracted from this 
signal and that could be correlated with 
first-person data. What shape or form would 
such analyses take is yet to be defined, but 
the idea is there. Fully aware of some of the 
limitations of using first-person data, they 
also propose strategies to ensure the quality 
of this data, by training participants or using 
experts in a given domain. I have no doubt 
that the work programme proposed by solo-
monova and sha will lead to very interesting 
insights into that intimate part of our lives, 
our dreams. I am almost as interested to see 
more of such applications of the enaction 
framework.
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> upshot • This commentary focuses on 
an ontological claim made by the au-
thors of this target article: that perceiv-
ing, imagining and dreaming are insepa-
rable. It explores how best to understand 
this “inseparability condition.” It is shown 
that the evidence needed to justify a 
strict reading of the inseparability con-
dition is lacking, while there is room for 
a more relaxed rendition of the insepa-
rability condition. The inferred lesson is 
that in developing an enactive neurophe-
nomenology of dreaming, it is a non-triv-
ial task to achieve clarity about the ontol-
ogy of dreaming, and its relationship to 
imagining as well as perceiving.
« 1 » Elizaveta solomonova and sha Xin 
Wei aim to champion a phenomenological 
and enactivist-driven account of dreaming. 
This focus seems right – especially in the 
light of recent advances in so-called 4E cog-
nitive science. The authors sketch a view in 
which a strictly brain-based, neuroscientific 
framework of dreaming is deemed insuf-
ficient. It is argued that our current dream 
research needs to be properly interpreted 
through the lens of an enactive neurophe-
